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U.S. vs. THEM: A PERSPECTIVE ON U.S. IMMIGRATION
LAW ARISING FROM UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GARCIA
AND THE COMBINATION OF IMPRISONMENT AND
DEPORTATION
ABSTRACT
This Comment centers on immigration law, specifically, U.S. im-
migration law. United States v. Rosales-Garcia, a recently published case
from the Tenth Circuit, was the original diving board for the thoughts
that follow. In Rosales-Garcia, Raul Rosales-Garcia (Rosales), an un-
documented immigrant, had been deported following a state drug convic-
tion and was caught having illegally returned to the United States. He
appealed the length of his sentence for a federal conviction of illegal
reentry. The district court had enhanced (increased) his sentence based
on the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Rosales appealed the level of en-
hancement. While the Tenth Circuit's decision ultimately helped to clari-
fy how sentence enhancements for Rosales and similarly situated de-
fendants are calculated, it did not answer a more fundamental question.
Prior to his illegal reentry, Mr. Rosales had been convicted of a state
drug-trafficking felony. He was sentenced to ninety days in jail and three
years of probation. After serving the ninety days in jail, Mr. Rosales was
deported. My question is, why, if we are going to deport an immigrant,
are we first bothering to imprison him?
This Comment considers the importance of citizenship by looking at
the roots of modem democratic civilization: ancient Greece and Rome.
The Comment then looks at the birth of the United States, specifically
the fact that from the beginning, this country was a nation of immigrants.
Now, the original popular perception of America as a haven welcoming
immigrants appears to have changed. America no longer seems so wel-
coming in light of the current popular perception that immigrants are
dangerous. The idea of immigrants as criminals is reflected in the hostili-
ty present in current immigration law, which is set up to both punish and
deport the criminally convicted immigrant. I suggest that deportation
itself is more properly a punishment than a collateral consequence, and
therefore the combination of deportation and imprisonment is excessive.
The time has come for reform; immigration law needs to reevaluate the
purposes it serves and ensure that the laws and regulations are set up to
further those purposes rather than to pay tribute to hostile feelings to-
wards the immigrants who continue to dare enter our land.
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INTRODUCTION
Well I'm so glad I'm livin' in the U.S.A.
Yes I'm so glad I'm livin' in the U.S.A.
Anything you want we got right here in the U.S.A.
-Chuck Berry, Back in the U.S.A.
This Comment deals with double jeopardy 2-a special kind of dou-
ble jeopardy not recognized by the U.S. legal system. 3 In our current
1. CHUCK BERRY, Back in the U.S.A., on REELIN'& ROCKIN' (Chess Records 1959).
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "double jeopardy" as "[t]he fact
of being prosecuted or sentenced twice for substantially the same offense"); see also U.S. CONsT.
amend. V (providing that no "person [shall] be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb").
3. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorpo-
ration of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 469, 481 (2007) ("[Blecause deportation
has been held not to be punishment, the constitutional bar on double jeopardy does not preclude the
government from bringing deportation proceedings once the person has completed his or her crimi-
nal sentence.").
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system of immigration law, deportation is not considered punishment.4
An undocumented immigrant convicted of a crime can therefore be both
imprisoned and deported.5 This was the experience of one such immi-
grant, Raul Rosales-Garcia (Rosales), who was convicted of a state felo-
ny, imprisoned, released on parole, and deported.6 But Rosales' saga of
crime and punishment did not end there. He was caught having returned
to the United States.7 His return was a double violation because it violat-
ed not only the terms of his probation but also the federal code. Rosales
was sent back to state prison to serve another sentence as punishment for
violating probation.9 After completing that sentence, he was released into
federal custody to be tried for the crime of illegal reentry.10 The Gov-
ernment sought not only to imprison Rosales for this charge but also to
enhance" his base sentence.12 It was the length of the enhancement that
Rosales appealed before the Tenth Circuit.
13
The Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Rosales-Garcia4
provided an important clarification for the particular sort of sentence
enhancement Rosales faced, that which is provided for undocumented
immigrants who have been previously convicted of a serious crime.' 5 A
drug-trafficking felony, like the one for which Rosales was convicted, is
enumerated as a serious crime for purposes of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines.' 6 The amount of enhancement depends upon the maximum
length of the sentence imposed for the prior crime.' 7 The question on
appeal was how much longer Rosales's federal sentence could be: either
a 12-level enhancement, based on the length of his original state sentence
of ninety days followed by three years of probation, or a 16-level based
on the maximum length of his probation-revocation sentence (fifteen
years), imposed after deportation.'" When Rosales-Garcia was decided,
4. See, e.g., id. at 472 ("For more than a century,. . . the courts have uniformly insisted that
deportation is not punishment.").
5. See United States v. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d 1348, 1349 (10th Cir. 2012); Legomsky,
supra note 3.
6. See Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1349.
7. See id
8. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012)).
9. Id.
10. Id
11. An enhanced sentence is one which is made longer for some reason. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 609 (defining "enhanced" as "[m]ade greater; increased").
12. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1349 (referring to the Presentence Report prepared by the
United States Probation Office).
13. Id. at 1349-50.
14. 667 F.3d 1348 (10th Cir. 2012).
15. See id. at 1349 ("The sentencing scheme embodied in § 2L1l.2 imposes, via enhancements
to the defendant's base offense level, more severe punishment for defendants who have committed
serious prior crimes.").
16. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2012); see also Rosales-
Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1349.
17. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)-(B).
18. The levels refer to the length of time by which a sentence can be increased (enhanced). If
the 12-level enhancement were applied to Rosales, the range of sentencing would be twenty-four to
2013] 771
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it was unclear whether the predicate sentence (the length of which de-
termines the level of enhancement) must have been imposed before de-
portation and subsequent reentry.' 9 The court in Rosales-Garcia held that
the predicate sentence must precede deportation and reentry.20 Only a
sentence imposed prior to the defendant's deportation and illegal reentry
may be used for enhancement of the federal sentence punishing illegal
reentry.2 1
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Gorsuch lamented the ambiguity in
the language of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, adding that whether his
interpretation or the majority's was correct "may be ultimately less im-
portant than the fact we're unable to agree."22 Not long after the decision
in Rosales-Garcia, the commentary accompanying the Sentencing
Guidelines was amended.23 It would seem that the U.S. Sentencing
Commission heard and complied with Judge Gorsuch's request for clari-
ty.24 With the official clarification provided by the amendment, the
courts will no longer be split on this issue and, at least regarding this
particular aspect, "similarly situated defendants [will] receive . . . con-
sistent treatment" by the federal courts.25
Though the Rosales-Garcia decision was restricted to the narrow
question of sentence enhancements of the criminal immigrant,2 6 it served
as the diving board for the broader consideration of U.S. immigration
law that follows. It may be somewhat intuitive that the penalty inflicted
upon the undocumented when caught within our borders is to eject them
and send them back whence they came. 27 What is not intuitive, however,
is why we feel the need to first imprison them within the very borders
from which we plan to evict them. The paradoxical penalty is that to pun-
ish the undocumented for being here when we don't want him, we shall
thirty months. When the U.S. Probation Office applied the 16-level enhancement, the result was a
range of thirty-seven to forty-six months. The district court applied the 16-level enhancement and
sentenced Rosales to a prison term of thirty-seven months. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1350.
19. See id. at 1354; United States v. Lopez, 634 F.3d 948, 952-53 (7th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Bustillos-Pena, 612 F.3d 863, 868-69 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Compres-Paulino,
393 F.3d 116, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
20. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1351 ("Because it is undisputed that the defendant's prior
conviction must have occurred before deportation, we agree with Mr. Rosales that the most logical
reading of§ 2L1.2 is to refer to the date of deportation in evaluating whether the 'sentence imposed'
for the prior felony exceeded 13 months.").
21. Id. ("In other words, we conclude that the temporal requirement contained in the text of §
2L1l.2 with regard to the defendant's conviction also applies to the imposition of his sentence for that
conviction.").
22. Id. at 1359 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
23. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii) (2012).
24. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1359; see also United States v. Catalan, 701 F.3d 331, 333
(9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) ("Recognizing this ambiguity, the Sentencing Commission recently
clarified the interpretation in Amendment 764 to the Guidelines . . . and discussed Bustillos-Pena,
Lopez, Rosales-Garcia, Guzman-Bera, and Compres-Paulino.").
25. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1359 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 1349 (majority opinion).
27. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 3, at 476 ("Violations of the immigration laws, naturally
enough, have consequences. One of those consequences is removal from the United States . . . .").
772 [Vol. 90:3
UNITED STATES V ROSALES-GARCIA
first force him to stay. Though we cannot properly define this as double
jeopardy,2 8 we may classify it as a double sanction for the undocumented
immigrant.
I suggest that a driving force behind this double sanction of incar-
ceration and removal provided by our legal system is a brand of xeno-
phobia which has directed the trend of U.S. immigration law over the
course of the twentieth century. 29 A good number of the American public
assumes that immigrants are here illegally. 30 In the case of Rosales, he
was in the U.S. illegally and was convicted of a felony.3' However, "the
vast bulk of immigration to the United States occurs through legal chan-
nels." 32 Why should the popular perception be that immigrants are ille-
gal?33 The preoccupation in this country is with illegal immigration ra-
ther than with the many legal channels of immigration.34 This reflects a
shift occurring in the twentieth century from a land calling on the rest of
the world to send us their "tired,... poor,. . . huddled masses yearning
to breathe free"35 to a nation edged with fences and border patrols. 3 6
Based on the continuing surge of immigration into the United States,37 it
would seem that the huddled masses are still eager to come to our shores
and partake of the American way of life to which Chuck Berry jubilantly
refers in Back in the U.S.A. This Comment considers why there has
been this shift in the American immigration paradigm. Why is it that the
Statute of Liberty no longer has the loudest voice on the border? This
Comment will suggest that the answer lies within a certain xenophobic
paranoia that immigrants are dangerous. 39
Part I of this Comment takes a brief look at the importance of citi-
zenship in the ancient world and considers both the disdain of foreigners
and the duty of hospitality to strangers. Part II turns specifically to the
28. See id. at 515 (citing Oliver v. INS, 517 F.2d 426, 428 (2d Cir. 1975) (refusing to apply
double jeopardy to a deportation proceeding)).
29. The fear being, in part, that immigrants are responsible for heightened crime in the United
States. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44
GA. L. REV. 65, 145 (2009) ("Surveys consistently show that the public associates immigrants-
whether or not undocumented-with high rates of crime.").
30. See Legomsky, supra note 3, at 503-04.
31. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1349.
32. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 503-04.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 504-05.
35. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN
LITERATURE 2601 (Nina Baym et al. eds., 6th ed. 2003).
36. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 3, at 509 (highlighting specifically increased border
patrol in an effort to respond to perceived "security vulnerabilities in the immigration laws").
37. See, e.g., Ayelet Shachar, Earned Citizenship: Property Lessons for Immigration Reform,
23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 110, 111 (2011) ("[The United States] annually accepts the largest intake of
immigrants in the world."); STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. IMMIGR. STUD., PROJECTING
IMMIGRATION'S IMPACT ON THE SIZE AND AGE STRUCTURE OF THE 21ST CENTURY AMERICAN
POPULATION 16 (2012) ("The high standard of living in the United States means that it remains an
attractive option for migration, particularly for people in less-developed countries.").
38. See BERRY, supra note 1.
39. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 29.
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United States and looks at the popular conception of America as the land
of opportunity with a warm welcome mat at Lady Liberty's feet. Part III
tracks the progression of immigration law in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries, looking specifically at the blending of civil immigration
law with criminal law and the related popular perception that if one is an
immigrant, then he is likely to be an undocumented one. Part IV turns to
United States v. Rosales-Garcia, summarizing the case's facts, procedur-
al history, and opinions. Part V analyzes the conclusions reached by the
majority and the dissent and concludes by discussing the odd state of
affairs presented by Rosales-Garcia: current immigration law is set up to
punish the criminal immigrant within our own penal system and then
remove the immigrant altogether. Part V also considers whether deporta-
tion truly is not punishment. The closing suggestion is that immigration
law should consider the purpose of this practice of combining imprison-
ment and deportation and whether it is necessary or desired.
I. "XENOLOGY"
Allez, venez, Milord




Etprenez bien vos aises
Vos peines sur mon coeur
Et vos pieds sur une chaise.
-Edith Piaf, Milordo
A. Prized Possessions: The Value of Citizenship in the Classical World
The ancient Greeks greatly prized and protected citizenship. 4' The
Greek polis42 was a closely knit community, with a dynamic akin to that
40. EDITH PIAF, Milord, on MILORD (Columbia Records UK 1959) ("Come along, Milord, /
Sit yourself at my table / It is so cold outside / Here it's comfortable. / Relax, Milord / And take your
at ease / Put your troubles on my heart / And your feet on a chair.").
41. See, e.g., SARAH B. POMEROY ET AL., ANCIENT GREECE: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND
CULTURAL HISTORY 451 (3d ed. 2012) ("Alexandria ... was founded [by Alexander] as a Greek
polis with citizenship limited to Greeks and Macedonians.").
42. H.D.F. Krro, THE GREEKS 64 (2d ed. 1957) ("Polis' is the Greek word which we trans-
late 'city-state."'); see also POMEROY ET AL., supra note 41, at 530 (defining polis as a "[c]ity [or]
town"). "Beginning in the eighth century, polis came to designate a political community, composed
of a principal city or town and its surrounding countryside, which together formed a self-governing
entity, the city-state." Id.
774 [Vol. 90:3
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of a family.43 Inclusion within the citizenry of the polis was therefore
strictly limited, and outsiders were rarely naturalized." The polis that
was perhaps the strictest in this regard was Sparta, who not only resisted
naturalization of outsiders but was also known for removing them entire-
ly from the community.45 While Athens was far more hospitable to out-
siders, citizenship and naturalization were severely limited.4 Inclusion
within the citizenry was an honor and much was expected of the citi-
zens.47 Pericles famously said, "We ... regard a man who takes no inter-
est in public affairs, not as a harmless, but as a useless character. . .' 8
Citizenship thus was not merely nominal membership within the citizen-
ry but literally a government ruled by the people. 49
In Rome, a civilization that greatly admired and, to a certain extent,
emulated the Greeks,o citizenship was also prized and protected.5' Take,
for example, the Social War, fought because the Romans denied citizen-
ship to their Italian city-state allies.52 In this instance, the Italian allies
43. See, e.g., C.M. BOwRA, THE GREEK EXPERIENCE 65 (1969) ("[The Greeks] felt that the
city-state was a natural development first of the family and then of the village .... [They did not]
look beyond rthe city-state, or polis,] to some more embracing unity.... Even when Athens and
Sparta built empires in the fifth century, these were largely coalitions, in which the members main-
tained a considerable degree of local autonomy, and there was little sense of corporate identity.");
KIaro, supra note 42, at 78 ("The polis was a living community, based on kinship, real or as-
sumed-a kind of extended family, turning as much as possible of life into family life.
44. See KITro, supra note 42, at 74.
45. See e.g., id. (using Pericles's Funeral Speech as recorded by Thucydides).
46. See, e.g., Simon Homblow, Greece The History of the Classical Period, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE CLASSICAL WORLD 135 (John Boardman et al. eds., 1986) ("A law of the year 451
[B.C.] restricted citizenship and thus its benefits ... to persons of citizen descent on both sides....
Athenian (and Spartan) stinginess with the citizenship was singled out by panegyrists of Rome as the
chief cause of the brevity of their empires."); see also Oswyn Murray, Life and Society in Classical
Greece, supra, at 210 ("[I]n the classical period the state intervened to establish increasingly strin-
gent rules for citizenship and so for legitimacy: ultimately a citizen must be the offspring of a legally
recognized marriage between two Athenian citizens, whose parents must also be citizens.... It
became impossible for an Athenian to marry a foreigner or to obtain recognition for the children of
any other type of liaison: the development is essentially democratic, the imposition of the social
norms of the peasant majority on an aristocracy which had previously behaved very different-
ly . . . .").
47. See, e.g., THE OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY 333-34 (Simon Homblower & Antony
Spawforth eds., 3d ed. 1996) (defining "citizenship, Greek"); id at 334-35 (defining "citizenship,
Roman").
48. Thucydides, The Funeral Oration of Pericles and the Plague, in GREEK AND ROMAN
CLASSICS IN TRANSLATION 410 (David McKay Co. ed., 1947).
49. See 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 442-43 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "democracy"
as "[g]ovemment by the people" and explaining that the word is derived from the combination of the
Greek words demos (the people) and kratia (rule)).
50. Perhaps the best example of Rome's admiration and emulation of the Greeks they con-
quered is Virgil's Aenied, hoped to be the Roman equivalent of Homer's Iliad. See, e.g., VIRGIL,
THE AENEID, Bk. VI, 11.847-53 (H. Rushton Fairclough trans., 1974) (19 B.C.) ("Others, I doubt not,
shall beat out the breathing bronze with softer lines; shall from marble draw forth the features of life;
shall plead their causes better; with the rod shall trace the paths of heaven and tell the rising of the
stars: remember thou, 0 Roman, to rule the nations with thy sway-these shall be thine arts-to
crown Peace with Law, to spare the humbled, and to tame in war the proud!" (footnotes omitted)).
51. THE OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 334-35 (defining Roman citi-
zenship).
52. Circa 91-88 B.C., Rome's Italian allies waged the Social War (also called the Marsic War
or the Italic War) against Rome. WILLIAM E. DUNSTAN, ANCIENT ROME 149-50 (2011). Rome was
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felt that having both served and paid tribute to Rome, they had a right to
become full citizens of Rome. 5 3 The city-states had long desired the ben-
efits of Roman citizenship, and this came to a head in the Social War.5 4
At the conclusion of the war, the city-states won their citizenship and the
associated privileges of Roman citizenship." Subsequently, the Roman
Empire continued this trend of granting the privilege of citizenship to her
allies. The benefits of Roman citizenship were conferred upon selected
members of the outlying territories that Rome had conquered and incor-
porated into the Empire.57
B. Us vs. Them: The Notion ofBarbarians
Fear of, dislike for, and distrust of foreigners has been a longstand-
ing tradition of civilized society. 8  The ancient Greek term
"ot 3apptpot" (hoi barbaroi) was used to refer to anyone who was not
Greek and thus foreign.59 This term has been transported into modem
English as "barbarians," 60 which tends to carry with it the additional as-
sociation of uncouth, uncivilized, and even savage.61 At first, this more
negative connotation of barbarian was not associated with the term as the
Greeks used it.62 As time passed, however, the connotations of foreigners
as uncouth and inferior to the Greeks became incorporated into the usage
of the term.63
C. Welcoming Them to the Table: The Role ofHospitality
In spite of the limits on naturalization and the view of non-Greeks
as uncultivated and even savage, it was a moral requirement of the
victorious mainly because of her concession to the Italian allies to grant them citizenship, which
united all of Italy south of the Po River by the common bond of Roman citizenship. Id.
53. See, e.g., Michael Crawford, Early Rome and Italy, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE
CLASSICAL WORLD, supra note 46, at 413-16.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. THE OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 1330 (entry for "Rome (histo-
ry)").
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., HAROLD MACMILLAN, RIDING THE STORM: 1956-1959, at 49 (1971) ("This kind
of isolationism or economic nationalism, amounting to xenophobia, seized all nations, great and
small, from time to time.").
59. A LEXICON: ABRIDGED FROM LIDDELL AND SCOTr'S GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON 126-27
(Oxford Univ. Press ed., 1997) (1891) [hereinafter A LEXICON] ("Plato divides mankind into Barbar-
ians and Hellenes, as the Hebrews gave the name of Gentiles to all but themselves. [FIrom the Au-
gustan age, the term was applied by the Romans to all nations except themselves and the Greeks: but
the Greeks still affected to look upon the Romans as Barbarians.").
60. See I THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 49, at 945.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., BOWRA, supra note 43, at 14 ("[1]n its early days the Greek word [for barbarian]
was not necessarily contemptuous or hostile, and meant little more than 'foreign."').
63. See, e.g., id. ("After the Persian Wars had revealed what hideous destruction could be
wrought by barbarian invaders, the Greek attitude hardened, and the word barbaros began to assume
some of its modem associations.").
[Vol. 90:3776
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Greeks to offer hospitality to the strangers who crossed the threshold. 4
Interestingly, the word "4evos" (xenos) in ancient Greek originally con-
noted guest, host, and stranger.65 It is from the Greek roots "xenos" and
"phobos" (fear, terror, dismay)66 that modem English derives the term
11,,67xenophobia. And so, Athens was thrown open to the world and for-
eigners were given hospitality but not citizenship.68
II. TIRED, POOR, AND HUDDLED MASSES 69
Tell the folks back home this is the promised land callin'
And the poor boy is on the line.
-Chuck Berry, Promised Lando
The United States of America proclaims to be a nation rooted in the
principle of "liberty and justice for all." 7 1 America was seen as the coun-
try where those suffering under the yoke of persecution could find asy-
lum and, ultimately, a new life. 72 And certainly this promise of safe ha-
ven from persecution was at least partially true for the early colonization
of American shores. 73 The Pilgrims, dissatisfied with their lives in Eng-
64. A LEXICON, supra note 59, at 471. Hospitality is also a recurring motif in classical my-
thology. See e.g., Ovid, Philemon and Baucis, in METAMORPHOSES 192 (A.D. Melville trans., Ox-
ford Univ. Press ed., 1986) (8 A.D.) ("This wicked neighbourhood shall pay / Just punishment [for
refusing to admit the gods across the threshold]; but to you there shall be given / Exemption from
this evil."); see also POMERORY ET AL., supra note 41, at 525. Xenia [guest friendship] is "[a] form
of ritual friendship whereby a 'stranger' (xenos) entered into a relationship of mutual friendship with
a man from another demos, each being obliged to offer hospitality and aid when visiting the other's
community.... A prominent feature of Homeric society, xenia continued throughout antiquity . .
Id.
65. A LEXICON, supra note 59, at 471.
66. Id. at 764.
67. 20 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 49, at 674 ("A deep antipathy to
foreigners.").
68. See, e.g., Thucydides, supra note 48 ("Our city is thrown open to the world, and we never
expel a foreigner .... ).
69. Lazarus, supra note 35.
70. CHUCK BERRY, Promised Land, on ST. LOUIS TO LIVERPOOL (Chess Records 1964).
71. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
72. See, e.g., Barbara Stark, Postmodern Rhetoric, Economic Rights and an International
Text: "A Miracle for Breakfast," 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 433, 438 (1993) ("Wave upon wave of immi-
grants have come to [America] to escape ancient systems of caste, class and ownership, to be rid of
bureaucracies and kings, to be left alone, free to make their fortunes by their own wit and hard work.
It is the American dream, and it has bred a wild energy, a spirit of openness and innovation marveled
at throughout the world." (citing ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA 13
(1992) ("Those intrepid Europeans who had torn up their roots to brave the wild Atlantic wanted to
forget a horrid past and to embrace a hopeful future. They expected to become Americans. Their
goals were escape, deliverance, assimilation. They saw America as a transforming nation, banishing
dismal memories and developing a unique national character based on common political ideals and
shared experiences."))).
73. See, e.g., William Bradford, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 121
(Nina Baym et. al. eds., 8th ed. 2012) [hereinafter NORTON ANTHOLOGY] ("For Bradford, as well as
for the other members of this community [the first wave of Pilgrims], the decision to settle at Plym-
outh was thc last step in a long march of exile from England, and the hardships they suffered ...
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land and in Holland, chose to immigrate to America.74 As the coloniza-
tion continued, many more people from England, France, Holland, Spain,
Portugal, and elsewhere settled in America.7 ' At the completion of the
American Revolution, the newborn United States reaffirmed their7 6 val-
ues of liberty, justice, and freedom for (almost) all.77 As further confir-
mation of America's warm welcome to all those who shared the treas-
ured value of liberty, the Statue of Liberty took her post at Ellis Island.
In 1903, the following words of welcome were etched in a plaque at her
base: "Give me your tired, your poor, / Your huddled masses yearning to
breathe free."79 Certainly, America was popularly associated with free
and welcome immigration.80
As time passed, America, peopled by a varied and multifaceted
mixture of backgrounds, continued to be perceived as welcoming immi-
were tempered with the knowledge that they were in a place they had chosen for themselves, safe at
last from persecution.").
74. See, e.g., Introduction: Pilgrim and Puritan, in NORTON ANTHOLOGY, supra note 73, at
13 ("In 1608, ... the Scrooby congregation [Pilgrims] left England and settled in the Nether-
lands.... Eventually, fearing that they might lose their religious identity as their children were
swallowed up in Dutch culture, they petitioned for the right to settle in the vast American territories
of England's Virginia Company.").
75. See generally I SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 84-86 (Meridian 3d ed. 1994) (1965).
76. Prior to the American Civil War, the United States were referred to in the plural form;
ever since the war, the United States has been referred to in the singular form. This syntactical shift
exhibits the reunited states' desire to be, once and for all, a single union rather than a league of
individual states. See Shelby Foote, The Civil War (PBS television series Sept. 23-27, 1990).
77. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. pmbl. ("We the People of the United States, in order to form a
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."); THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness."). I have noted this as "freedom and liberty for (almost)
all" because, of course, not everyone in the newborn United States was free, at least not until slavery
was repealed. See, e.g., American Literature 1700-1820: Pursuing Happiness, in NORTON
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 73, at 374 ("Of course, in 1820, many Americans were still not free. Some
of the Founding Fathers, including George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, were themselves
slave owners .... Men could not vote unless they owned property; women could not vote at all.").
78. Statue of Liberty, NAT'L PARK SERVICE, http:www.nps.gov/stli/index.htm (last updated
Mar. 21, 2013) ("The Statue of Liberty Enlightening the World was a gift of friendship from the
people of France to the people of the United States and is a universal symbol of freedom and democ-
racy. The Statue of Liberty was dedicated on October 28, 1886, designated as a National Monument
in 1924 and restored for her centennial on July 4, 1986.").
79. Lazarus, supra note 35 ("Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame, / With conquering
limbs astride from land to land; / Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand / A mighty woman
with a torch, whose flame / Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name / Mother of Exiles. From her
beacon-hand / Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command / The air-bridged harbor that
twin cities frame. / 'Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!' cries she / With silent lips. 'Give me
your tired, your poor, / Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, / The wretched refuse of your
teeming shore. / Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me, / I lift my lamp beside the golden
door!'" (footnotes omitted)).
80. The reference to "(almost) all" in note 77 is applicable here too, as there were concerns
regarding certain specific immigrants right from the birth of the nation. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion
Act of May 6, 1892, ch. 60, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GARCIA
grants with open arms.8 1 As Fievel Mousekewitz was told in the animat-
ed film An American Tail, "[Y]ou are in luck, my little immigrant. This
is America." 82 In the picture of America painted by Lady Liberty's iconic
lines, the United States was truly a land of the free where "the more the
merrier" held true. Was this utopian vision true? Perhaps. Did it hold?
Judging by the morass of complex immigration laws and criminal penal-
ties for undocumented immigrants, and coupled with tightened border
patrols and fences, it would seem that the American lens of immigration
is no longer quite so rosy-hued.8 4 What happened to "[g]ive me your
tired, your poor"? 5 One possible answer is that "[n]ow it reads 'NO
VACANCIES."'8 6
III. CRIMINALIZING IMMIGRATION
I just spent 60 days in the jailhouse
For the crime of having no dough, no no
Now here I am back out on the streets
For the crime of having nowhere to go!
-The Band, The Shape I'm In87
A. The View oflmmigrants as Criminals
There is no reason to assume that the term "immigrant" refers spe-
cifically to illegal immigrants88 ; however, that is the trend in our society
81. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 72, at 438-40 (describing the American "rhetoric of opportuni-
ty," which held "that there was plenty for everyone willing to work hard and take a chance in Amer-
ica" and continued through various waves of immigration from the colonial period to the Great
Depression).
82. AN AMERICAN TAIL (Amblin Entertainment 1986).
83. Lazarus, supra note 35.
84. See, e.g., Keith Aoki & John Shuford, Welcome to Amerizona-Immigrants Out!: As-
sessing "Dystopian Dreams" and "Usable Futures" of Immigration Reform, and Considering
Whether "Immigration Regionalism" Is an Idea Whose Time Has Come, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 3
(2010); Samuel Bettwy, Assisting Soldiers in Immigration Matters, 1992 ARMY LAW. 3, 3 ("Many
attorneys consider immigration law to be the most complicated area of American jurisprudence,
rivaled in its complexity only by tax law."); Kristina M. Campbell, Imagining a More Humane
Immigration Policy in the Age of Obama: The Use of Plenary Power to Halt the State Balkanization
of Immigration Regulation, 29 ST. Louis. U. PUB. L. REV. 415, 417 (2010); Kevin R. Johnson, Ten
Guiding Principles for Truly Comprehensive Immigration Reform: A Blueprint, 55 WAYNE L. REV.
1599, 1637 (2009) ("The U.S. immigration laws have long been incredibly complex. By many
accounts, only the much-maligned Internal Revenue Code rivals the intricate, lengthy, and frequent-
ly obtuse Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which is the centerpiece of modem American
immigration law."); Legomsky, supra note 3, at 509 (highlighting specifically increased border
patrol in an effort to respond to perceived "security vulnerabilities in the immigration laws"); Diana
R. Podgomy, Comment, Rethinking the Increased Focus on Penal Measures in Immigration Law as
Reflected in the Expansion of the "Aggravated Felony" Concept, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
287, 298 (2009).
85. Lazarus, supra note 35.
86. LETHAL WEAPON 4 (Warner Bros. 1998). The response to this line in the film was "I
guess your parents were Native Americans . . . ." Id.
87. THE BAND, The Shape I'm In, on STAGE FRIGHT (Capital Records 1970).
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today.89 My own mother is an English emigrant legally working and re-
siding here in the United States, so I know of legal channels of immigra-
tion from personal experience. And yet, I hear the term "immigrant" and
my mind, like that of so many others, conjures an image of someone
crawling under a barbed-wire fence on the Texas-Mexico border.90 It is
clear that a certain hostility towards immigrants is present in America
today.9' Again, that "NO VACANCIES" slapped across the Statue of
Liberty's slogan crops up. Famous, or in some circles infamous, exam-
ples of this hostility appear in state and local immigration initiatives,
such as Arizona Senate Bill 1070 and California Proposition 187.92 One
has only to look at the statements by Barbara Coe, Proposition 187's
drafter, to see evidence of this hostility:
'You get illegal alien children, Third World children, out of our
schools, and you will reduce the violence. That is a fact.... You're
not dealing with a lot of shiny face, little kiddies.. .. You're dealing
with Third World cultures who come in, they shoot, they beat, they
stab and they spread drugs around in our school system.93
While Proposition 187 was never passed, Arizona's new immigra-
tion law is in full legal effect. 94 There is certainly a lot that can be, and
has been, said about Arizona's controversial immigration law.9 5 The fact
that the title of the law is "Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe
88. See Legomsky, supra note 3, at 503-04 ("Although the vast bulk of immigration to the
United States occurs through legal channels, the public thinks the opposite is true.").
89. See id at 471-72 ("Public perception of criminals and foreigners have become ever more
intertwined."); see also Campbell, supra note 84.
90. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 3, at 502-04.
91. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 84, at 416, 418-19.
92. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Apr. 23, 2010) (amended by H.B. 2162, 49th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Apr. 30, 2010)); Proposition 187, 1994 Cal. Stat. A-317 (approved by
electors Nov. 8, 1994); see also Johnson, supra note 84, at 1606 ("[Tjhe state and local immigration
ordinances have been motivated in no small part by racism and nativism.").
93. See Podgomy, supra note 84, at 299 n.90 (quoting Jennifer M. Chac6n, Commentary,
Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L.
REv. 1827, 1841 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Apr. 23, 2010) (amended by H.B. 2162, 49th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Apr. 30, 2010)).
95. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 passim (2012); Karla Mari
McKanders, Unforgiving of Those Who Trespass Against US.: State Laws Criminalizing Immigra-
tion Status, 12 LoY. J. PUB. INT. L. 331, 352 (2011) ("Numerous lawsuits have been filed challeng-
ing the constitutionality of S.B. 1070."); Scott Nakama, Senate Bill 1070: The Implication ofArizo-
na's Immigration Law upon MLB, 8 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 23 (2011) (describ-
ing Arizona's Senate Bill 1070 as "one of the most controversial pieces of immigration legislation in
recent history"); Lisa Sandoval, Race and Immigration Law: A Troubling Marriage, 7 MODERN AM.
42, 43 (2011); David A. Selden et al., Placing S.B. 1070 and Racial Profiling into Context, and What
S.B. 1070 Reveals About the Legislative Process in Arizona, 43 ARiZ. ST. L.J. 523, 523-24 (2011)
("S.B. 1070 is fascinating on many levels for many reasons. It has focused a national and interna-
tional spotlight on Arizona. It has broadened and intensified the national debate regarding immigra-
tion policies and enforcement. It has tested the constitutionality of state and local enforcement of
immigration laws... . S.B. 1070 is so controversial in part because of strong feelings and deep
divisions about racial profiling.").
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Neighborhoods Act"96 strongly suggests that perception of immigrants as
criminals was a driving force behind the law. Initiatives like Proposi-
tion 187 and Senate Bill 1070 are specifically designed to target immi-
grants.97
Let's take another example, this time from the turn of the twentieth
century: the passing of laws prohibiting marijuana.98 When these federal
marijuana laws were enacted, right around the time that Prohibition end-
ed, the Mexican-American population was the main consumer of mariju-
ana.99 So, the addition of marijuana to the list of banned substances ef-
fectively created a new crime for the Mexican-American immigrant pop-
ulation.'00
This new crime was at least partly a response to the growing popu-
lation of Mexican immigrants. While twenty-two states had prohibited
marijuana between 1910 and 1931, marijuana was not targeted on the
federal level until 1932.101 That year, marijuana was added to the catalog
of banned drugs listed in the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act.102 The follow-
ing year, Prohibition was repealed. 0 3 Four years later, Henry J. Ansling-
er, Director of the new Federal Bureau of Narcotics, successfully passed
the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 after just three days of truncated hearings
unsupported by empirical findings or research.10 4 The early twentieth
century saw a significant increase in the number of Mexicans immigrat-
ing into the western United States. os From the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury through the 1930s, there was very little in the way of general public
concern regarding the use of marijuana. 06 It was generally thought that
Mexican immigrants were the main users of marijuana and thus the ones
bringing the "narcotic" into the country.' 0 7 Not coincidentally, the first
states to restrict marijuana were the southwestern states. 08 When Texas
passed the McMillan Senate Bill, which included marijuana restrictions,
the Austin Texas Statesman noted, "[Marijuana is] a Mexican herb ...
96. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Apr. 23, 2010) (amended by H.B. 2162, 49th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Apr. 30, 2010)).
97. Id.; Proposition 187, 1994 Cal. Stat. A-317 (approved by electors Nov. 8, 1994).
98. See Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (repealed
1970).
99. Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread, II, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of
Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REV.
971, 1011 (1970).
100. See id. at 1012.
101. Id. at 1010.
102. Id.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
104. Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 99, at 1054.
105. Id. at 1012.
106. Id. at 1011.
107. Id. at 1012.
108. Pete Guither, Why Is Marijuana Illegal?, DRUGWARRANT.COM,
http://www.drugwarrant.com/articles/why-is-marijuana-illegal/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (refer-
ring, in chronological order, to California, Wyoming, Texas, Iowa, Nevada, Oregon, Washington,
Arkansas, Nebraska, and Montana).
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said to be sold on the Texas-Mexican border." 09 Accordingly, the early
days of marijuana illegalization appeared targeted toward the Mexican
immigrants, the drug's primary user group, and arguably reflected the
American West's negative view of immigrants and immigration." 0
What does this brief overview of our nation's marijuana war have to
do with the criminalization of immigration laws? Marijuana was feared
as subversive."' Mexican immigrants (along with other minority groups
in the East) were the main users during this period.1 2 For this reason, the
law banning marijuana can reasonably be viewed as a prophylactic
measure designed, at least in part, to protect citizens from the Mexican
immigrants who used the drug." 3 As Professors Bonnie and Whitebread
put it, "We conclude that the legislative action and judicial approval [of
marijuana restrictions] were essentially kneejerk responses uninformed
by scientific study or public debate and colored instead by racial bias and
sensational myths.""14
This perception of immigrants as criminals bringing drugs to our
country has not abated."' Kevin Johnson points to an "all-too-common
... headline: 'Illegal Alien Indicted for Possession With Intent to Dis-
tribute Marijuana."' 16 According to Johnson, "[t]he reference to 'illegal
alien,' . . . serves to inflame passions and tilt the debate toward favoring
more immigration enforcement (especially at the expense of 'criminal
aliens') and more restrictive immigration laws."" 7 Furthermore, the An-
ti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 described its policy goal as providing a
"drug-free America" by "reducing the number of drug users and decreas-
ing the availability of illegal drugs."" 8 One available inference is that by
keeping out immigrants (specifically, Mexican and South American im-
migrants), the United States can curb the availability and use of illegal
drugs within her borders.
109. See Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 99, at 1014 (quoting the June 19, 1923 Austin Texas
Statesman) (internal quotation mark omitted).
110. See id at 1012, 1015 (pointing out "that public perception of marijuana's ethnic origins
and crime-producing tendencies often went hand in hand, especially in the more volatile areas of the
western states," and although there was not much public awareness of the drug, newspapers in the
1930s would include the occasional "vociferous allusion to the criminal conduct inevitably generated
when Mexicans ate 'the killer weed').
111. See, e.g., REEFER MADNESS (Motion Picture Ventures 1936).
112. Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 99, at 1012.
113. See id. at 1012-16.
114. Id at 1010.
115. See Johnson, supra note 84, at 1633.
116. Id. (quoting Illegal Alien Indicted for Possession with Intent to Distribute Mariuana,
STATES NEWS SERV., Dec. 10, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Id (quoting Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
118. Podgomy, supra note 84, at 292.
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Another modem example of how the perception of immigrants as
dangerous has served to shape immigration law is the USA PATRIOT
Act, passed in the aftermath of September 11, 2001."
Just as the War on Drugs had its effect on immigration, the War on
Terror had a marked effect on the criminalization of immigration.120 A
fear of all immigrants based on the immigrant status of the terrorists led
to heightened immigration measures premised on the need for national
security.121 Based on an "examination of the rhetoric behind the recent
immigration laws," Diana Podgomy interprets three justifications for the
increasingly strict criminal immigration laws: "[T]he perception that
non-citizens are the reason for increasing criminality in the United
States, a desire to protect ... the economic interests of citizens, and a
blurred line between crime control efforts related to non-citizens and
protection of national security."1 22
B. The Blurred Line Between Civil and Criminal Law in the Immigration
Context
A cognizable trend in modem American immigration law is that the
criminal code has been imported and transmuted into the body of civil-
based immigration law.123 Although immigration law has always con-
tained at least some aspects of the penal system,124 the modem trend has
been accused of unfairly taking "the enforcement components of crimi-
nal justice without the corresponding adjudication components." 25 A
example of the "lacking adjudication" component is arguably the fact
that deportation of immigrants subsequent to criminal proceedings does
not fall within the category of double jeopardy as deportation is consid-
119. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral Damage
Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 856 (2003) ("The USA PATRIOT Act expands the defini-
tion of 'terrorist activity' for purposes of the immigration laws in ways that may result in an addi-
tional removal ground for noncitizens convicted of assault and similar crimes. 'Terrorist activity'
thus has gone the way of 'aggravated felony' for immigration purposes, expanded well beyond what
one normally would consider to be truly 'terrorist' in nature. The USA PATRIOT Act further pro-
vides that a spouse or child of a 'terrorist' generally is inadmissible. A noncitizen also may be
deemed inadmissible for being 'associated with a terrorist organization,' broad terms reminiscent of
the principle of guilt by association, a discredited law enforcement technique popular during the dark
days of the McCarthy era. Fears also have been expressed that the expanded definition of 'terrorist
activity' in the USA PATRIOT Act will adversely affect bona fide asylum-seekers fleeing persecu-
tion in their native lands." (footnotes omitted)).
120. See Podgomy, supra note 84, at 298-300 ("[T]he primary motivation behind the 1996
Acts and the USA PATRIOT Act was a concern over national security."); see also Johnson, supra
note 119.
121. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 3, at 508-10.
122. Podgomy, supra note 84.
123. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 3, at 469 ("Sometimes dubbed 'criminalization,' the trend
has been to import criminal justice norms into a domain built upon a theory of civil regulation.").
124. Podgomy, supra note 84, at 289 ("Immigration law has always contained some elements
of penal law in its attempt to preempt criminal aliens from seeking naturalization in the United
States, but the lines between immigration and penal law have recently become increasingly blurred."
(footnote omitted)).
125. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 473.
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ered a collateral consequence rather than a direct, punitive consequence
of an immigrant's criminal proceeding. 12 6
Recent laws have added enhanced punishments for immigrants con-
victed of crimes as well as easier avenues of deportation. 12 7 The Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988 introduced the notion of an aggravated felony,
which provided for harsher penalties of imprisonment, expedited remov-
al, and longer bans on reentry for immigrants guilty of the crimes falling
within the "aggravated felony" definition.' 2 8 While this started as a very
narrow definition, limited to murder and trafficking of weapons or drugs,
it has since expanded so that "now an aggravated felony need no longer
be either aggravated or a felony" for purposes of removing immi-
grants. 129 The increased ease of deportation based on these criminal stat-
utes has greatly increased the number of such federal prosecutions. "Im-
migration cases are now the largest single category of federal prosecu-
tions, accounting for 32% of the annual total"1 30 and "surpassing even
drug prosecutions."13'
It is in this current context of criminalized immigration that we turn
to United States v. Rosales-Garcia. Earlier this year, the Tenth Circuit
decided this immigration case, which involved an illegal immigrant who
was convicted and imprisoned on a drug charge. He was released on pa-
role and deported, and was then caught having illegally reentered the
United States, a violation of both his parole and federal law.1 32 The ques-
tion at issue in the case was whether the enhancement of the defendant's
federal sentence could be based on the parole-revocation sentence fol-
lowing deportation or whether it had to be based on the original sentence
prior to deportation.133
126. See id. at 481-82 ("[C]riminal prosecution is therefore an add-on, not a substitute, for
deportation.").
127. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012).
128. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified
throughout 8 U.S.C.); see also Legomsky, supra note 3, at 484 ("In its nascent form, the aggravated
felony definition was defined narrowly, in keeping with the harsh consequences .... The term
included only murder, weapons trafficking, and drug trafficking. [The aggravated felony definition]
is now a colossus." (footnote omitted)); Podgorny, supra note 84, at 292.
129. Podgomy, supra note 84, at 289.
130. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 479 80 (referring to the increase in Department of Homeland
Security's recommended immigration prosecutions).
131. Podgomy, supra note 84, at 308.
132. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012); United States v. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d 1348, 1349 (10th
Cir. 2012).
133. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1349.
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IV. UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GARCIA
"Oh help me in my weakness"
I heard the drifter say
As they carried him from the courtroom
And were taking him away.
-Bob Dylan, Drifter's Escape'34
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 2008, a Utah state court convicted Raul Rosales-Garcia of a
drug-trafficking felony and sentenced Rosales to ninety days in jail and
three years' probation.' 31 Upon being released on probation, Rosales was
deported.13 6 Following his removal, Rosales reentered the country in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and was soon arrested by federal agents.'37
The Utah state court imposed a probation-revocation sentence as a con-
sequence for Rosales illegally reentering the country in violation of the
terms of his probation.138 While the original state drug-trafficking sen-
tence was a term of ninety days, the probation-revocation sentence was a
term of one to fifteen years.139 Rosales served his time in state prison and
was then released into federal custody to be prosecuted for his illegal
reentry.140
Rosales chose to participate in the district of Utah's fast-track pro-
gram by agreeing to plead guilty to the federal charge.141 In its Presen-
tence Report, the United States Probation Office recommended a 16-
level enhancement of Rosales' sentence based on section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)
of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and Rosales's fifteen-year state proba-
tion-revocation sentence.142 Not surprisingly, Rosales objected to the 16-
level enhancement.143 Unlike the drifter in Bob Dylan's song,'" Rosales
had no opportunity for escape, but he did have the opportunity for ap-
pealing the Presentence Report. 145 Specifically, Rosales challenged the
"procedural reasonableness of his [federal] sentence" because his state
134. BOB DYLAN, Drifter's Escape, on JOHN WESLEY HARDING (Columbia Records 1967).







142. Id. Note that, for purposes of section 2Ll.2 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the maxi-
mum term of the previous sentence is used for purposes of calculating a sentencing enhancement.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1l.2 cmt. n. I (B)(vii) (2012).
143. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1349.
144. See DYLAN, supra note 134.
145. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1350.
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sentence for the base offense of drug trafficking did not exceed thirteen
months at the time of his illegal reentry and thus, argued Rosales, should
not satisfy the 16-level enhancement requirements of sec-
tion 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).1 46 Rosales conceded that his original sentence made
him eligible for a 12-level enhancement of his sentence but was not will-
ing to concede his eligibility for the 16-level enhancement, which relied
on the state probation-revocation sentence rather than on the sentence for
his base drug-trafficking conviction. 147 Rosales properly reserved his
issue for appeal, arguing that the statutory language only allows en-
hancements for the sentence imposed at the time of his illegal reentry. 48
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo.14 9 If the court were to
agree with Rosales, he would face a 12-level enhancement, providing a
sentence range of twenty-four to thirty months' imprisonment for the
federal charge." 0 If the court were to agree with the federal Government,
Rosales would face a 16-level enhancement, providing a sentence range
of thirty-seven months to forty-six months.''
B. The Majority Opinion
The appeal in this case was based solely on a question of law. The
facts, as summarized above, were, according to the Tenth Circuit,
straightforward, uncomplicated, and uncontested.15 2 The narrow issue
before the court was whether a sentence can be enhanced based on a pri-
or sentence that did not exceed the minimum sentence length until after
the deportation and subsequent illegal reentry.'53 The Sentencing Guide-
lines contained in section 2L1.2 allow for more severe punishments for
illegal immigrants who have committed sufficiently serious prior
crimes.154 The relevant provision directs the government to increase the
base offense level by sixteen levels "[ijf the defendant previously was
deported . . . after ... a conviction for a felony that is ... a drug traffick-
ing offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months."' 55
Therefore, the question presented for the court was, when may a predi-
cate sentence be imposed in order to be eligible for calculation of section
2L1.2 sentence enhancements.156
146. Id. at 1349-50.
147. Id. at 1355.
148. Id. at 1349-50.
149. Id. at 1350 (citing United States v. Ford, 613 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2010)) ("We review de
novo a district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines where the appellant's argument
was properly preserved before the district court.").
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1349.
153. Id.
154. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
155. Id
156. See Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1349.
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Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Rosales's interpretation of
the Guidelines and remanded the case to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Utah for resentencing.'57 Because the Tenth Circuit concluded
that the predicate sentence must have been imposed before the defend-
ant's deportation, the court remanded the case for resentencing based on
the length of Rosales's original state jail sentence, eligible only for the
12-level enhancement.' 58 The court reached its conclusion by focusing on
the language of the statute,' 59 the Sentencing Commission's accompany-
ing application notes, and analogous precedent.' 60
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Whereas the majority concluded that Rosales's interpretation of the
Sentencing Guidelines was correct,161 the dissent concluded that the
Government's interpretation was preferable. 162 In his opinion, Judge
Gorsuch dissected the statutory language. 163 After pointing out the ambi-
guity in the construction of the statute, Judge Gorsuch turned to the ac-
companying commentary and concluded that it resolved the ambiguity
by specifically stating that the predicate "sentence imposed" includes
"any terms of imprisonment given upon revocation of probation, parole,
or supervised release."6 The dissent held that "any terms of imprison-
ment" would include even those given on revocation of parole following
the defendant's deportation and illegal reentry.'65 This conclusion was in
accord with the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Compres-
Paulino,166 a case which presented the same issue of when a predicate
sentence must have been imposed in order to apply for the higher 16-
level sentence enhancement.'
67
Based on the dissent's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines
and accompanying commentary, Rosales' state sentence imposed after
his deportation and subsequent reentry would apply for purposes of the
Guidelines.'68 Because his probation-revocation sentence of one to fif-
teen years exceeded thirteen months, Rosales would then be subject to
157. Id. at 1355.
158. Id.
159. "If the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States
after . .. a conviction for a felony that is (i) a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence im-
posed exceeded thirteen months[, add a sentence enhancement]." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).
160. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1350-55.
161. Id. at 1355.
162. See id. at 1357 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
163. See id. at 1355-57.
164. Id. at 1357 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii))
(internal quotations marks omitted).
165. Id. at 1356-57 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii))
(internal quotations mark omitted).
166. 393 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
167. Id. at 118.
168. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1357 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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the 16-level enhancement for his federal sentence.' 69 Judge Gorsuch's
dissenting opinion therefore held that the district court "got it right" and
properly applied the 16-level enhancement. 17 0
V. ANALYSIS
I asked him for water, he poured me some wine
We finished the bottle, then broke into mine.
-Bob Weir, The Greatest Story Ever Toldl71
A. The Question Presented
The question on appeal was whether the district court had correctly
applied the 16-level enhancement to Rosales's federal sentence.17 2 As
previously noted, the 16-level enhancement provided in the Sentencing
Guidelines can only be applied when the preceding conviction carried a
sentence longer than thirteen months.173 Rosales's original state sentence
(prior to his deportation and subsequent reentry) would not satisfy the
16-level enhancement requirements set out above because his original
ninety-day sentence did not exceed thirteen months. 174 However,
Rosales's one- to fifteen-year probation-revocation sentence, if used for
the calculation of enhancing the federal illegal reentry sentence, certainly
would qualify Rosales for the 16-level enhancement.'75 Even if Rosales
were to only serve the minimum of that sentence (i.e., one year, which
would not exceed thirteen months), it would not matter for the purpose of
section 2L1.2 because the accompanying commentary clearly states that
when the previous sentence is a range of time, the maximum length of
that sentence is to be used for sentencing purposes.176 In the event that
Rosales's enhanced state drug-trafficking sentence could be used for
sentencing, fifteen years would be the length of the sentence imposed,
thereby clearly subjecting Rosales to the 16-level enhancement.
B. The "[S]entence [O]nly a [G]rammar [T]eacher [Clould [L]ove"l 77
Both the dissenting opinion and the majority opinion point out that
the phrasing of the statute allows for two separate interpretations.77 The
169. Id.; see also id. at 1349 (majority opinion).
170. Id. at 1357 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
171. BOB WEIR, The Greatest Story Ever Told, on ACE (Warner Bros. Records 1972).
172. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1349 (majority opinion) ("The sole question presented before
us on appeal is whether the 16-level enhancement in USSG § 2Ll.2(b)(l)(A) applies to a defendant
whose sentence for an earlier drug trafficking felony was made longer than 13 months after the
defendant was deported and committed the base offense of illegal reentry.").
173. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1 .2(b)(1)(A) (2012).
174. Id. § 2L1l.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii); see also Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1349 (majority opin-
ion).
175. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1l.2(b)(1)(A).
176. Id § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii).
177. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1356 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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majority went with the interpretation of a temporal restriction on when a
predicate sentence was imposed;17 9 the dissent interpreted the statute to
mean any predicate sentence, whether imposed before or after deporta-
tion and subsequent reentry. 8 0
While certain phrases, such as "venial syntactical sins"'"' and the al-
literative "prudent penological policy," 82 seem unnecessarily overblown,
Judge Gorsuch's dissenting opinion made it readily apparent that he
agreed with the Government's interpretation of the Sentencing Guide-
lines. 18 3 To be fair, this interpretation was in accord with that of the Sec-
ond Circuit.' 84 Nonetheless, Rosales's interpretation, shared by the ma-
jority and the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, was plausible, not precluded by
the language, and preferred in light of the policy behind the Sentencing
Guidelines.' 85 As the dissent's reasoning focused more on an analysis of
the language, we shall look first to the dissent's analysis.
The dissent turned first to the relevant language of sec-
tion 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), denouncing it as "a sentence only a grammar teach-
er could love." 86 The language of the statute is as follows: "If the de-
fendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United
States, after ... a conviction for a felony that is ... a drug trafficking
offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded thirteen months[, add a
sentence enhancement]."l 87 The dissent pointed to the string of preposi-
tional phrases,188 the passive voice,1 8 9 and the "scraggly expression of
time" 90 as the "gnarled" grammar of the statute.9
The dissent observed that the use of the past tense is not particularly
helpful in the statute. Judge Gorsuch reasoned that the past tense of "im-
posed" and "exceeded" could equally indicate a sentence given prior to
deportation or any other sentence imposed before the current prosecu-
tion. 192 The majority agreed that this was a plausible interpretation but
178. See id. at 1351-52, 1356-58.
179. See id at 1351 (majority opinion).
180. Id. at 1357 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 1355.
182. Id at 1358.
183. Id. at 1357.
184. United States v. Compres-Paulino, 393 F.3d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
185. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1351-52 (majority opinion).
186. Id. at 1356 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
187. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1l.2(b)(1)(A) (2012).
188. Id. ("If the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United
States, after ... a convictionfor a felony that is ... a drug trafficking offensefor which the sentence
imposed exceeded thirteen months[, add a sentence enhancement]." (emphasis added)).
189. Id. ("If the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United
States, after ... a conviction for a felony that is .. .a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence
imposed exceeded thirteen months[, add a sentence enhancement]." (emphasis added)).
190. Id ("If the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United
States, after ... a conviction for a felony that is ... a drug trafticking offense for which the sentence
imposed exceeded thirteen months[, add a sentence enhancement]." (emphasis added)).
191. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1356.
192. Id
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declined to concede that it was the better interpretation based on the Sen-
tencing Commission's commentary and the purpose behind the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines.' 9 3 The dissent agreed that the first prepositional phrase
made clear that the prior conviction must occur before deportation.' 94
However, the dissent reasoned, "[W]e can have no similar confidence
that the 'sentence imposed' must [come prior to deportation]" because
the prepositional phrase modifying "sentence imposed" is placed "two
modifying phrases away."
Let us walk through the grammar ourselves. At its most basic, the
sentence in section 2L1.2 is an if-then statement. If the court is dealing
with a prior drug-trafficking conviction that imposed a sentence longer
than thirteen months, then add a sentence enhancement. Based on the
facts in this case, we may ignore the "or unlawfully remained in the
United States" line because Rosales was deported and illegally reen-
tered.'96 The string of prepositional phrases referenced by the dissent
read, "[W]as deported . . . after .. . a conviction for a felony that is ... a
drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13
months."' 97 Both the phrase "for which the sentence imposed exceeded
13 months" and "for a felony that is a drug trafficking offense" modify
the term "conviction."' 98 It does not matter that the "sentence imposed"
phrase "comes at the caboose of the prepositional train." 99 What matters
is that both phrases modify conviction, and the conviction must come
after deportation. Therefore, the grammatical construction of the sen-
tence, as the majority held, indicates that the conviction and its corre-
sponding sentence must come before the deportation. Said in a slightly
simpler fashion, if the defendant was deported after a drug-trafficking
felony conviction for which the sentence imposed exceeded thirteen
months, then apply the 16-level enhancement.
C The Purpose Behind the Sentencing Guidelines
The majority's discussion of the overall purpose behind sec-
tion 2L1.2 provides a helpful foundation for understanding the reasoning
of the court.2 00 As the majority pointed out, both parties in the case
agreed that "the purpose of § 2L1.2(b)(1) is to punish illegal reentry
more severely where the defendant has committed one or more of certain
enumerated prior crimes," including the drug-trafficking felony at issue
here. 20 1 The method for determining the seriousness of the prior crime is
193. Id. at 1351 n.2 (majority opinion).
194. Id at 1356 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
195. Id.
196. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Rosales-Garcia, 67 F.3d at 1356 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting).
200. Id at 1353-54 (majority opinion).
201. Id. at 1353.
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to look at the maximum sentence imposed on the defendant.2 02 The court
stated that using the sentence as a measure of the prior crime's magni-
tude may be rough, but it is nonetheless one that provides at least a mod-
icum of consistency and "numerically prescribed" precision. 20 3 Simply
put, the longer the sentence a defendant received in state court, the more
serious the offense would appear in a situation like this.20
In spite of the fact that his probation-revocation sentence was
"technically imposed as part of the punishment process for an earlier
felony," the majority agreed with Rosales's interpretation of the Com-
mission's intentions. 205 This interpretation was that "the Commission did
not intend consideration of a sentence imposed as a result of post-
,,206
deportation actions. As the court adroitly pointed out, the increased
sentence stemming from Rosales's failure to comply with his probation
by reentering the country had nothing to do with the seriousness of the
original drug-trafficking offense.207 The court reasoned that this interpre-
tation, which looks only to the sentence of the prior offense before the
deportation, is consistent with the distinction between pre- and post-
deportation and reentry drawn by section 2L1.2.208
The dissent expressed the concern that the majority, by accepting
Rosales's interpretation and the distinction between pre- and post-
deportation proceedings, altogether ignored probation-revocation sen-
tences when calculating the seriousness of an offense. 20 9 The majority's
response to this concern was that the categorization as original sentence
or as probation-revocation sentence was not the determining aspect and
cited United States v. Moreno-Cisneros,210 where a probation-revocation
sentence was taken into consideration during sentencing. 211 However, in
Moreno-Cisneros, the revocation of probation occurred before deporta-
tion.212 Thus, the Rosales-Garcia court held that the temporal placement
of the sentence, whether it occurs before or after deportation, is definitive
when applying the Sentencing Guidelines.2 13
This temporal focus is, according to the Rosales-Garcia court, sup-
ported by the language of both the statute and the accompanying notes
supplied by the drafters.2 14 In his argument, Rosales stressed the choice
202. Id. at 1353-54.
203. Id.





209. Id. at 1358 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
210. 319 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2003).
211. Id. at 457.
212. Id. at 458.
213. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1355 (majority opinion).
214. Id. at 1350-53.
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and placement of the word "after" in section 2L1.2(b)(1), along with the
"repeated use of the past tense . . . in referring to the predicate drug traf-
ficking felony sentence." 215 In the language of the statute, "[i]f the de-
fendant previously was deported ... after ... a conviction for a felo-
,,216 - 217ny, the conviction is read to precede the deportation. The use of the
past tense for the words "imposed" and "exceeded" was interpreted by
Rosales and the majority to mean that that there must be some date of
reference before which the predicate sentence was given. 2 18 The court
reasoned that the date of reference is the same for both the prior convic-
tion and the predicate sentence; 219 therefore, because there is no dispute
that the prior conviction must take place before deportation, the predicate
sentence must occur before deportation as well.220
In its argument, the Government countered that the Sentencing
Commission's commentary to section 2L1.2(b)(1) indicates that any sen-
tence prior to the federal sentence is eligible for the purposes of sentence
enhancement.221 The commentary defines "sentence imposed" as "any
term of imprisonment given upon revocation of probation."222 The major-
ity accused the Government of "urg[ing] a simple truism: 'any' means
'any."' 223 While the dissent was persuaded by this "simple truism," the
22majority was not.224 Instead, the majority relied on the fact that the com-
mentary did not mention the temporal aspect at issue here.225 Because the
commentary did not mention the temporal constraint at issue in Rosales-
Garcia and similar cases, the majority concluded that the Government's
226interpretation was not consistent with the commentary.
Furthermore, the court explained "any term of imprisonment" for
sentences imposed by way of the "relation back" doctrine.22 7 Rather than
referencing any conviction as an indication that post-deportation convic-
tions count, the Rosales-Garcia court understood the commentary to be
instructing courts to consider all of the defendant's convictions prior to
the illegal reentry, regardless of how far in the past those convictions
occurred.228
The dissent proceeded to respond to the remaining points made in
the majority opinion. Judge Gorsuch found that the commentary's silence
215. Id. at 1351.
216. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Ll.2(b)(1)(A) (2012).
217. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1351.
218. Id
219. Id at 1351-52.
220. Id. at 1351.
221. Id. at 1352.
222. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(vii).
223. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1352.
224. Id.
225. Id
226. Id at 1353.
227. Id. at 1352.
228. Id.
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on the temporal restraint, and the analogous silence regarding the issue in
the four supporting cases cited by the Commission, did not indicate "lim-
iting language" about the sentence imposed.2 29 The dissent accused the
majority of relying on mere guesswork about the commentary's silence
and omission to amend in light of the circuit split.23 0 The dissent also
rejected the policy concern of arbitrary anomalous results based on
"whether state or federal officials happen to collar the defendant first"
because the federal courts have the discretion in sentencing to consider
fairness concerns such as this.23 1 Of course, this discretion suggests that
federal courts can do exactly the same overreach of authority that the
dissent accused the majority of doing: using discretion when applying the
Sentencing Guidelines. In short, the dissent did not convincingly respond
to the analysis of the majority.
D. Precedential Support and the Circuit Split
Throughout its opinion, the Rosales-Garcia majority included refer-
ences to precedential support. For persuasive authority, the court cited
four opinions from other circuits regarding the same issue: United States
232 233v. Lopez, United States v. Bustillos-Pena, United States v.
Jimenez,"' and United States v. Guzman-Bera.":' In all these cases, the
courts similarly concluded that a sentence enhancement under sec-
tion 2L1.2 could only be based on a conviction prior to deportation.236
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit agreed in Lopez that the Sentencing
Commission's commentary did not support the Government's view that
any conviction, including those after deportation, would apply for sec-
tion 2L1.2.237
Additionally, the court offered the fact that none of the four cases238
chosen by the Sentencing Commission to support the commentary's def-
inition of "sentence imposed" implicated the temporal issue of post-
deportation convictions.239 In all of the four cases offered by the com-
mentary, the previous sentence imposed occurred before deportation and
subsequent illegal reentry. 240 The court pointed out that the commentary
included these four cases but excluded Guzman-Bera, which implicates
229. Id. at 1357 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 1358 n.l.
231. Id. at 1358-59.
232. 634 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2011).
233. 612 F.3d 863 (5th CiT. 2010).
234. 258 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2001).
235. 216 F.3d 1019 (11th Cir. 2000).
236. Lopez, 634 F.3d at 950; Bustillos-Pena, 612 F.3d at 869; Jimenez, 258 F.3d at 1125-26;
Guzman-Bera, 216 F.3d at 1021.
237. Lopez, 634 F.3d at 953.
238. United States v. Moreno-Cisneros, 319 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Compi-
an-Torres, 320 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hidalgo-Macias, 300 F.3d 281 (2d Cir.
2002) (per curiam); United States v. Rodriguez-Arreola, 313 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2002).
239. United States v. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d 1348, 1353 (10th Cir. 2012).
240. See d
2013] 793
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the temporal constraint.24 And so, the court did not find an intention by
the commentary to include post-deportation sentences within the mean-
ing of a "sentence imposed" for purposes of section 2L1.2.242 The court
noted that this conclusion did not strip the commentary of all meaning;
for any probation-revocation sentence imposed prior to deportation, the
enhancement provisions set forth in section 2L1.2 would certainly apply
based on the definition set forth in the commentary.243
The opinion also acknowledged the presence of a circuit split on the
precise issue of the case.2 44 The majority specifically referenced United
States v. Compres-Paulino, a per curiam case that came to precisely the
opposite conclusion as that of the Rosales-Garcia court.245 in Compres-
Paulino, the Second Circuit found that "any punishment assessed for a
violation of probation is actually imposed for the underlying convic-
tion." 24 6 The court in Rosales-Garcia chose to follow the Fifth and Sev-
enth Circuits not only for the reasons outlined above but also because the
Rosales-Garcia court was concerned with the "needless and nonsensical
aberrant results" that would flow from the Compres-Paulino holding.24 7
Specifically, the aberrant results with which the court was concerned
were that a defendant like Rosales could be punished more or less se-
verely based solely upon "the happenstance that his state probation was
revoked before his federal prosecution commenced." 2 4 8 In other words,
the Rosales-Garcia court disdained the consequence of different sentenc-
es based only upon the coincidence of sequencing.249 Under the holding
in Compres-Paulino, Rosales would have received only the 12-level en-
hancement had the State of Utah revoked his probation after the federal
trial but the higher 16-level enhancement if Utah had revoked the proba-
tion before the federal sentence. 2 5 0 According to the majority, avoidance





244. Id at 1354 ("We acknowledge that our decision is squarely in conflict with the Second
Circuit's holding in United States v. Compres-Paulino.").
245. Id. at 118-19; Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1354.
246. Compres-Paulino, 393 F.3d at 118 (quoting United States v. Huerta-Moran, 352 F.3d 766,
770 (2d Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
247. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1354.
248. Id.
249. Id. ("One particular concern we have with [the Compres-Paulino] decision is the disparate
treatment it gives to like offenders whose prosecutions have happened to differ sequentially. As Mr.
Rosales points out, if we were to adopt the Second Circuit's rule, Mr. Rosales would face more
substantially increased punishment solely because of the happenstance that his state probation was
revoked before his federal prosecution commenced.... [This] bolster[s] our conclusion ... by
acknowledging that it avoids needless and nonsensical aberrant results.").
250. See Compres-Paulino, 393 F.3d at 118 19.
251. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d at 1354.
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The court also noted that the Sentencing Commission omitted
amending its Guidelines contained in the commentary in spite of the
holdings of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in Bustillos-Pena and Lopez,
respectively. 2 52 The decision in Bustillos-Pena presented the first circuit
split on the temporal issue of pre- and post-deportation.253 And yet, the
Sentencing Commission did not amend its commentary.2 54 The opinion
in Lopez, which agreed with the Fifth Circuit, was issued a mere month
before the Sentencing Commission submitted proposed amendments to
the 2011 congressional session. 2 55 And still, the Commission failed to
amend the definition of "sentence imposed." 256 While the court admitted
that this failure to amend is far from dispositive, the court noted, "[T]he
Commission's failure to address this [narrow] issue . . . offers at least a
modicum of further support for the notion that the Fifth and Seventh Cir-
cuits' construction of the provision is not inconsistent with the Commis-
sion's intention." 25 7 In conclusion, the majority held that Rosales's inter-
pretation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was the better interpretation
by way of an opinion that was thoughtful, well reasoned, well supported,
and complete with rational responses to the reasoning contained in the
dissent.258
E. Judge Gorsuch's Plea for Clarification
To his credit, Judge Gorsuch ended his dissent well. He closed with
"a plea for syntactical assistance" from the Sentencing Commission.2 5 9
He closed by calling upon the Commission to clear up the confusion
once and for all. 260 Because, as he rightly pointed out, the current state of
affairs means that "similarly situated defendants receive different sen-
tences only because of the happenstance of the circuit in which they
sit."261 Although I agree with the reasoning and holding of the majority, I
also agree that clarity on this issue, one way or the other, is to be desired.
It would appear that the Sentencing Commission heard Judge Gor-
such's plea.262 Effective November 1, 2012, Amendment 764 to the Sen-
tencing Guidelines confirmed that the majority's interpretation of a tem-
poral restraint on when a "sentence imposed" may apply is correct 2 6 3: A
sentence following revocation of probation may still apply for purposes
252. Id.
253. Id. (discussing United States v. Bustillos-Pena, 612 F.3d 863 (5th Cir. 2010)).
254. Id.
255. Id. (discussing United States v. Lopez, 634 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2011)).
256. Id.
257. Id at 1355.
258. See generally id. at 1349-55.
259. Id. at 1359 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
260. Id
261. Id.
262. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Ll.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii) (2012); see also
United States v. Catalan, 701 F.3d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
263. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii); United States v.
Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d 1348, 1355 (10th Cir. 2012).
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of section 2L.1 but only when the revocation occurred before deporta-
tion.264 The Sentencing Commission indicated that the amendment re-
sponds to and resolves a "circuit conflict" and discussed the holding in
Rosales-Garcia.2 65 So, as it turns out, the majority got it right. And be-
cause Judge Gorsuch's plea for clarification by the Sentencing Commis-
sion was granted, defendants in Rosales's position will receive consistent
treatment in all the federal circuits. Indeed, one such similarly situated
defendant has already felt the effect of the amendment. 266 In United
States v. Catalan, the amendment was applied retroactively to a defend-
ant who had been given a higher level of sentence enhancement based on
his post-deportation probation-revocation sentence.267 As was Rosales's,
Catalan's fate was remanded back to the district court for sentencing
based on a 12-level, not a 16-level, enhancement.268
F. The Paradox ofPunishing and Removing
What does this case teach us? For starters, the case illustrates the
level of complexity now standard within immigration law. 2 69 The differ-
ence between the holding in Rosales-Garcia and the holding in the Sec-
ond Circuit also illustrates the "inconsistent and unpredictable applica-
tion" of immigration laws. 270 The Rosales-Garcia decision further serves
as an example of the increasing "criminalization" of immigration law
through the use of enhanced sentencing.271 But the case also highlights a
paradox-the fact that Rosales was both imprisoned in the United States
and removed from the country. What sense does this make? When the
law provides for removal of illegal immigrants, including those who, like
Rosales, have committed crimes in this country, why do we feel the addi-
tional need to punish prior to deportation? As it currently stands, immi-
gration law views deportation not as punishment but rather as a conse-
quence divorced from the punishment of incarceration.2 72 Therefore, un-
264. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Ll.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii) ("The length of the
sentence imposed includes any term of imprisonment given upon revocation of probation, parole, or
supervised release, but only if the revocation occurred before the defendant was deported or unlaw-
fully remained in the United States.").
265. See Catalan, 701 F.3d at 333 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AMENDMENTS TO THE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 26 (2012)).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 333 ("Pursuant to the amendment, which we apply retroactively, we hold that the
district court erred in imposing a 16-level enhancement under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), rather than a
12-level enhancement under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(B).").
268. Id.
269. See Bettwy, supra note 84.
270. Podgomy, supra note 84, at 315.
271. See United States v. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d 1348, 1349 (10th Cir. 2012); Legomsky,
supra note 3, at 476.
272. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 3 ("[B]ecause deportation has been held not to be pun-
ishment, the constitutional bar on double jeopardy does not preclude the government from bringing
deportation proceedings once the person has completed his or her criminal sentence." (footnote
omitted)).
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documented immigrants like Rosales can be both imprisoned and re-
moved.273
Can it really be argued that deportation is not punishment? The
courts insist that "deportation is not punishment."2 74 However, most peo-
ple would see deportation-being sent into exile away from the place
considered home and the people considered friends and family-as a
punishment.2 7 5 Historically, deportation was used as punishment (e.g.,
the practice of sending convicted criminals out of English prisons and
into the American and Australian colonies).276 The current argument that
deportation is not punishment "is tautological: deportation is not pun-
ishment because we do not view it as punishment." 2 77
In spite of the insistence that deportation is not punitive, it seems
that the ends of deportation bear a striking resemblance to traditional
theories of punishment, "particularly retribution, deterrence, and incapac-
itation." 278 The most obvious connection between deportation and tradi-
tional theories of punishment is the connection between incapacitation
and deportation.279 Incapacitation is "the isolation of the undesirable of-
fender from society."280 It does not require sophisticated scholarship to
see that deportation serves the purpose of incapacitation even better than
imprisonment; if the individual is removed from a country, then he is no
longer able to cause trouble in that country. The deterrence theory of
punishment provides that the individual offender (specific deterrence) as
well as potential future offenders (general deterrence) will be discour-
aged from committing the offense through knowledge of the attendant
consequences if caught. 2 8 1 This same general deterrence theory arguably
holds true for deportation as well. 28 2 If immigrants are aware of the pos-
sible consequence of deportation, they are less likely to commit the of-
fense that could carry a deportation consequence with it. 2 83 The retribu-
tion theory of punishment has perhaps the weakest connection with de-
284
portation. However, "even retribution might well come into play when
273. See id.
274. See id. at 472.
275. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1889, 1895 (2000) ("[Mlost
people undoubtedly do see deportation as punishment.").
276. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 3, at 513 (citing Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Pun-
ishment: A Historical Analysis of the British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern
Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 115, 129 (1999)).
277. Kanstroom, supra note 275.
278. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 488.
279. See, e.g., id. at 513-14.
280. Id. at 514.
281. Id.
282. Id
283. Id. at 514-15 ("Congress might well feel that the threat of deportation, with all its long-
term effects, deters unlawful entries or violations of the terms of one's admittance.").
284. See id. at 514 ("The retribution rationale for criminal punishment admittedly has less
universal application to deportation .... .").
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deportation is predicated upon the commission of an independent wrong,
rather than upon the remedying of an immigration status violation."285
I will not delve further into the connection between deportation and
the traditional theories of punishment here. Let it be sufficient for the
moment to note that having citizens pay for the jail time of the criminally
convicted non-citizen and then having the immigrant deported upon re-
lease is overkill. Immigration law needs to consider what the larger pur-
pose behind incarceration and deportation is and then make a rational
decision regarding the fate of convicted non-citizens. Either we accept
the criminal immigrant, punish him, and release him into our society
after his rehabilitation, 286 or we "sentence" him to deportation. It seems
to me that current immigration law does not have a sufficient reason for
both imprisoning and then deporting.
CONCLUSION
Red and white, blue suede shoes
I'm Uncle Sam, how do you do?
Gimme five; I'm still alive! Ain't no luck; I learned to duck!
-The Grateful Dead, U.S. Blues287
What is the purpose of immigration law? Dean Johnson has noted
that the United States has often been unclear about the goals of the im-
migration laws.288 It is clear that we want to protect our citizens. Regard-
less of whether immigrants pose an actual threat, a perceived threat has
resulted in a trend toward criminalizing immigration laws.289 It is also
clear that in order to be naturalized, immigrants coveting American citi-
zenship must have "good moral character." 2 90 This desire to protect our
citizens and to guard our citizenship from those lacking good morals is
both natural and beneficial. However, where do we fall on the other end
of the spectrum? Do we still retain any of that welcoming, hospitable
sentiment that we posted on our Statue of Liberty? 2 9 1 In a nation built on
285. Id
286. Of course, this option has its own problems; if such an option were put in place, then the
easiest way to become naturalized would be conviction of a crime.
287. THE GRATEFUL DEAD, U.S. Blues, on FROM THE MARS HOTEL (Grateful Dead Records
1974).
288. Johnson, supra note 84, at 1638.
289. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 3, at 469 ("Sometimes dubbed 'criminalization,' the trend
has been to import criminal justice norms into a domain built upon a theory of civil regulation.");
Podgomy, supra note 84, at 289 ("Immigration law has always contained some elements of penal
law in its attempt to preempt criminal aliens from seeking naturalization in the United States, but the
lines between immigration and penal law have recently become increasingly blurred." (footnote
omitted)).
290. 8 U.S.C. § l 101(f) (2012).
291. Lazarus, supra note 35.
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mass immigration,2 92 is it fair that we have slapped a "NO VACANIES"
sign over those words of unqualified welcome? It is time to address the
issue of immigration within the context of our modem world and take a
stand. If nothing else, consistency in the application of the law needs to
be achieved. During his 2004 presidential campaign, President Obama
declared:
Now is the time. Now is the time not just for comprehensive immi-
gration reform at the federal level, but for humane, meaningful im-
migration reform that respects the dignity of all persons and reflects
both a knowledge and embrace of international human rights law. . .
that fulfills the promise of our great nation as a haven for persons the
world over regardless of race, color, ethnicity, or national origin.293
I am not presuming to be able to provide satisfactory answers to all
these questions here, nor am I able to suggest a comprehensive reform of
one of the most complex areas of U.S. law.294 I do, however, hope to
have illustrated through this Comment that immigration laws, specifical-
ly the combination of enhanced punishment by imprisonment and re-
moval that Mr. Rosales encountered, are colored by hostility towards
immigrants. In the process of writing, it was pointed out to me that even
using the term "illegal immigrant" risks perpetuating the stigma of im-
migrants as criminals.295 So, rather than providing the necessary reform,
my goal was to expose one of the problems in immigration law and
thereby show that reform is necessary.
This is not to say that there should not be laws affecting non-citizen
immigrants. The simple fact of the matter is that undocumented persons
residing in this country are here illegally. But in determining the conse-
292. See, e.g., Ayelet Shachar, Earned Citizenship: Property Lessons for Immigration Reform,
23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 110, 110 n.1 (2011) (noting that the literature supporting America as a
"'nation of immigrants' is too vast to cite").
293. See Campbell, supra note 84, at 457-58.
294. Immigration law has been dubbed as one of the most complex areas of U.S. law. See
Bettwy, supra note 84; Johnson supra note 84.
295. See also Chac6n, supra note 93, at 1838-39 ("By the 1950s, the phrases 'illegal immi-
grant' and 'illegal alien' had become a staple of the popular lexicon. Today, the press, politicians
and individuals and organizations promoting restrictionist immigration laws commonly use the
phrases 'illegal alien' and 'illegal immigrant' when describing unauthorized migrants in the United
States. Thus, in law and language, there is a clear link between irregular status and illegality. Care is
not always used in how the 'illegal immigrant' label is applied. With their entry and their labor
criminalized, certain groups of migrants-most commonly Mexicans-increasingly bear the label
'illegal aliens,' whether or not that label applies to them. In other words, the term 'illegal alien'
(which has no clear legal meaning) is not only used to signify irregular migrants, but also often
applied to those perceived as irregular migrants, regardless of actual immigration status. These
perceptions of undocumented status are heavily influenced by racial stereotypes." (footnotes omit-
ted)); Clifton R. Gruhn, Comment, Filling Gaps Left by Congress or Violating Federal Rights: An
Analysis of Local Ordinances Restricting Undocumented Immigrants' Access to Housing, 39 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 529, 529-30 (2008) ("This author deems it inaccurate to refer to a group
of people as 'illegal' simply because they have committed a criminal act by entering the United
States without obtaining permission from the government. . . . [I]t is more accurate to describe them
as undocumented immigrants.").
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quences for those illegally present, the law should not be colored by xen-
ophobia. If the purpose is simply to curtail the number of undocumented
residents, then deportation is enough and punishment inhospitably gratui-
tous. Some laws are necessary, but as it stands currently, the additional
punishment of imprisonment with the very real possibility of enhanced
sentencing goes beyond necessity. This is intended to raise the provoca-
tive question of whether we are obliged to incarcerate non-citizens at all.
And so, in closing, I echo Judge Gorsuch's plea for clarification.2 96
Instead of clarification of the specific ambiguity presented by section
2L. 1, I call for clarification of the need for any level of sentence en-
hancement. Rather than debating or reforming the level of enhancement
and when that enhancement may be imposed, let us question whether we
require the sentence in the first place. Does this serve some purpose of
criminal justice or does this instead satisfy a xenophobic urge to enhance
the punishment of those who dare presume to trespass on our land? I
propose that the latter is the better interpretation. At best, the combina-
tion of imprisonment and deportation reflects ambivalence in the law's
consideration of the theory behind the practices.297 This urge is not prop-
er within the edicts of blind justice. Justice should be served on the un-
documented immigrant either through deportation or jail time, not both.
In short, the time for immigration reform has come.
Anna Natalie Rol*
296. United States v. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d 1348, 1359 (10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
297. See Kanstroom, supra note 275, at 1934 ("In the field of immigration law in general, and
deportation law in particular, the lack of a comprehensive theoretical approach has been ... prob-
lematic. Classifying the proceedings as 'civil' has simply subjected questions of fairness and rights
to decisions based on a muddle of models.").
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